We develop a finite horizon continuous time market model, where risk averse investors maximize utility from terminal wealth by dynamically investing in a risk-free money market account, a stock, and a defaultable bond, whose prices are determined via equilibrium. We analyze the endogenous interaction arising between the stock and the defaultable bond via the interplay between equilibrium behavior of investors, risk preferences and cyclicality properties of the default intensity. We find that the equilibrium price of the stock experiences a jump at default, despite that the default event has no causal impact on the underlying economic fundamentals. We characterize the direction of the jump in terms of a relation between investor preferences and the cyclicality properties of the default intensity. We conduct a similar analysis for the market price of risk and for the investor wealth process, and determine how heterogeneity of preferences affects the exposure to default carried by different investors.
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Introduction
The default of a systemically important entity can have an impact on the rest of the economy through a number of different mechanisms. For instance, firms that have exposures to the defaulted entity through market transactions, can experience a deterioration in fundamentals driving the value of their assets. Under adverse circumstances this can lead to a domino effect, where the default of one firm causes financial distress on entities with which the firm had business relations. This distress can propagate through the financial system causing a cascading failure, leading in the worst case to the collapse of a significant portion of the system (the recent credit crisis being a clear example). In the context of interbank lending, Giesecke and Weber (2006) propose a reduced form contagion model, while Amini et al. (2010) and Amini et al. (2011) use tools from random graph theory to analyze short term counterparty credit exposures. Dynamic contagion models are considered in Dai Pra et al. (2009) , and more recently in Cvitanić et al. (2011b) .
Alternatively, there may be a purely informational effect, where the default of one firm triggers the market participants to update their perception of the state of the economy. For example, Collin-Dufresne et al. (2003) show that the unexpected default of an individual firm can lead to a market-wide increase in credit spreads, and demonstrate via calibration that the risk premium due to contagion risk may be considerable.
A third possibility is that the sudden shock associated with the default event leads to a reallocation of wealth as the economy returns to equilibrium. This may in turn cause rapid price changes due to linkages that stem from the equality between supply and demand. The aim of the present paper is to study this mechanism in a continuous time financial model, including default risk, where prices are determined endogenously in equilibrium.
While models of economic equilibrium have been studied for a long time, it is only recently that fully dynamic stochastic models of equilibrium have received significant attention. Dumas (1988) considers a dynamic equilibrium model with two investors, and characterizes the equilibrium behavior of the wealth allocation and risk-free rate, assuming that the stock returns are specified exogenously. Chabakauri (2010) considers a similar economy, but allows for the possibility of portfolio constraints, and analyzes cyclicality properties of market price of risk and stock return volatilities. Bhamra and Uppal (2009) consider a continuous time economy populated by two power utility agents with heterogenous beliefs and preferences, and give closed form expressions for consumption policies, portfolio policies, and asset prices. The same model as in Bhamra and Uppal (2009) is considered by Cvitanić et al. (2011a) and Cvitanić and Malamud (2011) , who extend the results by Bhamra and Uppal to the case of an arbitrary number of agents, including an asymptotic analysis for large time horizons. Cvitanić and Malamud (2010) provide decompositions into myopic and non-myopic components for market price of risk, stock volatility, and hedging strategies. In the same economic model, Wang (1996) studies how investor preferences affect the term structure of interest rates.
The literature on dynamic equilibrium models, including the papers mentioned above, has been concerned primarily with models where equilibrium prices have continuous paths. This means that dramatic and sudden changes, such as crisis events or major defaults, are absent-and indeed these papers have focused on other economic phenomena. An exception is Hasler (2011) , which considers a Lucas economy with multiple defaults, where the default intensities are constant.
In the present paper we study a finite horizon continuous time model, where rational investors maximize utility from terminal wealth. Three securities are liquidly and dynamically traded: a money market represented by a locally risk-free security, i.e. investors can borrow from or lend to each other without default, a stock representing shares of the aggregate endowment, and a defaultable bond. We assume a constant recovery model. The intensity of the defaultable bond may, but need not, depend on the economic fundamentals. As we demonstrate, introducing a defaultable security in the economy leads to new insights regarding the behavior of securities prices, market price of risk, and wealth allocation. For instance, we find that the equilibrium price of the stock typically jumps when default occurs, despite the fact that the underlying economic fundamentals are entirely unaffected by the default event. Moreover, the direction of the jump (up or down) depends in a non-trivial way on the interplay between investor preferences and the cyclicality properties of the default intensity. In particular, we show that upward jumps in the stock price are possible if, roughly speaking, the default intensity is sufficiently counter-cyclical. The precise statement is given in Theorem 4.1. We also show that a similar analysis, with similar conclusions, can be carried out for the wealth processes of individual investors, see Section 5. In this connection, we investigate how heterogeneity of preferences affects the exposure to the default carried by the different investors.
Due to the possibility of default, there are two sources of risk in our model: diffusion risk and jump risk. Using techniques from the theory of filtration expansions, which has a long and successful history in credit risk modeling, we are able to guarantee market completeness, even in the presence of jumps, see also Bielecki et al. (2006a) and Bielecki et al. (2006b) for a detailed analysis of market completeness and replication strategies in reduced form models of credit risk. This allows us to identify a unique market price of risk process, corresponding to diffusion risk, and default risk premium process, corresponding to jump risk. It turns out that the two quantities are intimately linked, see Proposition 3.2. By means of a quite delicate mathematical analysis, these quantities are studied in the case of constant interest rate and default intensity.
The most natural interpretation of the phenomena we study is as a form of systemic risk, arising in an economy consisting of securities carrying both market and default risk. While systemic risk effects generated from equilibrium models have been studied, for instance in Allen and Gale (2000) and Freixas et al. (2000) , these papers use static discrete time models, exclusive of default, where the focus is on characterizing optimal risk sharing across banks with different credit profiles, or belonging to different geographical sectors. Differently from most research efforts, our model exhibits an endogenous interaction between the stock and the defaultable bond, which arises via the interplay between equilibrium behavior of the investors and their risk preferences.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the economic model. Section 3 analyzes the market price of risk in equilibrium along with its behavior at the default event. Section 4 characterizes the behavior of the equilibrium stock price at default via a relation between cyclicality properties of short rate and default intensity, and investor preferences. Section 5 performs a similar analysis for the wealth process of a risk-averse agent, and, in the case of a power utility investor, provides monotonicity relations between the size of the jump and the level of risk aversion. Section 6 concludes the paper. The proofs of the necessary lemmas are deferred to the appendix.
The Model
This section sets up the framework that will be used to derive our results. Section 2.1 briefly reviews the reduced form model of default. Section 2.2 introduces the economic environment and the agents, while the equilibrium is described in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 provides useful decompositions of the stock price and the state price density. We use basic results from utility maximization and duality theory whose proofs can be found, for instance, in the textbook by Cvitanić and Zapatero (2004) .
The Probabilistic Model
Let (Ω, F, P) be a complete probability space, supporting a standard Brownian motion B = (B t ) 0≤t≤T . Let F = (F t ) 0≤t≤T be the augmented filtration generated by B, which satisfies the usual hypotheses of completeness and right continuity. We use a standard construction (also called Cox construction) of the default time τ , based on doubly stochastic point processes, using a given strictly positive F adapted intensity process λ = (λ t ) 0≤t≤T . To this end, we assume the existence of an exponentially distributed random variable χ defined on the probability space (Ω, F, P), independent of the process B. The default time τ is then defined as
The market filtration G = (G t ) 0≤t≤T , which describes the information available to investors, is
That is, it contains all information in F t , together with the knowledge of whether τ has occurred or not, and has been made right-continuous. It is a well-known result (see e.g. Bielecki and Rutkowski (2001) , Section 6.5 for details) that the process
is a G-martingale under P. In other words, λ is the default intensity (or hazard rate) of τ .
An important consequence of the previous construction is that Hypothesis (H) holds, i.e. every F martingale remains a G martingale, see Bielecki and Rutkowski (2001) . It then follows from a result by Kusuoka (Theorem A.1 in Appendix A) that every square integrable G martingale may be represented as a sum of a stochastic integral with respect to M and a stochastic integral with respect to B.
The market model
We consider an extension of the setting in Cvitanić and Malamud (2010) that incorporates default risk. The evolution of the economy is driven by an underlying state process D = (D t ) 0≤t≤T , whose dynamics is specified by
It is assumed that µ D : R + → R and σ D : R + → R + are such that a strictly positive, strong solution exists. We also assume that µ D and σ D are infinitely differentiable on (0, ∞), and that σ D > 0. There are two risky assets in the economy: a stock and a defaultable bond, whose prices at time t are denoted by S t and P t , respectively. These prices will be determined endogenously in equilibrium. The stock pays a terminal dividend of D T at time T , so that S T = D T , whereas the defaultable bond pays
Here 0 < ε < 1 is a constant recovery value paid at time T in case default happens at or before T . We assume that ε is deterministic, although many calculations would still be valid as long as ε is F T -measurable. Neither the stock, nor the defaultable bond generates any intermediate dividends or other cash flows. We also assume the existence of a locally risk free money-market account with interest rate r = (r t ) 0≤t≤T . Finally, we assume that the default intensity λ t and interest rate r t are of the form λ t = λ(D t ) and r t = r(D t ) for deterministic functions λ and r. The same assumption has also been used by Cvitanić and Malamud (2010) for the interest rate. The stock and the defaultable bond are both assumed to be in positive (unit) net supply, whereas the money-market account is in zero net supply.
The economy is populated by a finite number of investors, indexed by k, who are endowed with initial wealth w k > 0, and optimize expected utility from final wealth. They all have identical beliefs given by the historical probability P, but can have different utility functions U k . These are assumed to be twice continuously differentiable, strictly concave, and satisfy Inada conditions at zero and infinity: lim
The agents can trade in the three assets continuously and without frictions such as transaction costs, using self-financing and admissible trading strategies. More details concerning trading strategies and wealth processes are given in Section 5. Let us also recall two important measures of risk aversion, namely the coefficient of absolute risk aversion U and of relative risk aversion L U . These are defined as
2)
It should be remarked here that our model has a natural interpretation in terms of sovereign default risk, a topic which has received significant attention due to credit quality deterioration (see the case of Greece), experienced by governments in the last few years. Indeed, we can think of D t as the economic growth process of a large economy, such as the United States. Further, assume that the US government issues two types of securities: local shares (stocks) and government bonds (default free bonds), whereas a smaller country issues bonds that are subject to sovereign default risk. The default intensity λ t of the foreign country depends on the wealth status D t of the United States. On the other hand, the default time τ of the foreign country might not have a sizeable impact on the fundamentals of the United States economy, which would be mostly influenced by events happening to G-10 countries, for example.
Equilibrium and Market Prices
We use the following standard notion of equilibrium:
Definition 2.1 The market is said to be in equilibrium if each investor behaves optimally and all the securities markets clear.
We restrict attention to equilibria where markets are arbitrage free and complete. Standard equilibrium theory, see Constantinides (1982) , then shows that security prices coincide with those in an artificial economy populated by a single, representative investor. We denote the corresponding utility function by U , and assume that U is twice continuously differentiable, strictly concave, and satisfies Inada conditions at zero and infinity. The state-price density is then given by
where Z is the Radon-Nikodym density process corresponding to the (unique) risk-neutral measure Q,
The equilibrium market price processes are then obtained from (D T , P T ) via
Theorem A.1 (see Appendix) now implies that S t and P t are of the form
Since we focus on equilibria where markets are complete, the model primitives
is invertible. A detailed analysis of conditions under which this holds is a nontrivial matter that falls outside the scope of the present paper; we refer the reader to Hugonnier et al. (2012) for a related discussion.
Pre and Post Default Decompositions
A useful way of viewing certain quantities of interest is by decomposing them into pre-and postdefault components. Specifically, Equation (2.3), the definitions of D T and P T , and Lemma A.1 in Appendix A, yield
Moreover, relying again on Lemma A.1, we obtain
where
As pointed out by an anonymous referee, while a priori a decomposition such as (2.7) only determines S pre t (resp. S post t ) for t < τ (resp. t ≥ τ ), the processes S pre t and S post t are in fact uniquely determined since they are F adapted.
Equilibrium market price of risk
In this section, we derive expressions for the market price of (diffusion and default) risk, as well as the risk premium of the stock. The risk premium is defined as the excess growth rate of the asset above the risk-free rate, namely µ S t − r t . By Theorem A.1 (see Appendix) the density process Z associated with the risk-neutral measure has the representation dZ
for some G predictable processes θ and κ. An application of Girsanov's theorem shows that
are (G, Q) local martingales, and in particular B Q is (G, Q) Brownian motion. Note that
so that the risk-neutral default intensity is given by λ Q t = λ t (1 + κ t ). The quantity κ t is called the default risk premium, and θ t is called the market price of risk. We fix this notation from now on. Note that κ and θ are only determined up to dt ⊗ dP -equivalence, and that the behavior of κ after τ is irrelevant.
Proposition 3.1 The market price of risk is given by
where −θ pre is the volatility of ξ pre , and −θ post is the volatility of ξ post . The default risk premium is given by
The risk premium associated with the stock, or the equity risk premium, is given by
Proof. The assertions concerning θ and κ follow from Lemma A.2 and the definition of θ t and κ t , since ξ t = e − t 0 rsds Z t . Let us establish the expression for the risk premium. The relations between B and B Q , respectively M and M Q , together with the P-dynamics of the stock price yield
The drift term equals r t dt since the discounted stock price is a martingale under Q. . The contribution to the equity risk premium coming from default risk therefore has the same sign as
This quantity is minus the size of the jump in the stock price, were default to happen at time t. In particular, if the stock price jumps down at default, then the investors require a premium for holding the stock, as they want to be compensated for the loss incurred upon default. On the other hand, if the stock jumps up at default, then it becomes an attractive security to hold, and investors are willing to pay a premium for holding it. We will study the sign of the jump in more detail in Section 4; suffice it to say here that positive price jumps, while atypical, are indeed possible.
There is an interesting relationship between the sensitivity of κ t with respect to changes in the level of the economic state process, and the market price of diffusion risk. To state the result, first observe that the Markovian structure allows us to write
for some measurable function κ(t, x). We now have Proposition 3.2 The function κ is differentiable, and the derivative κ x = ∂κ ∂x is given by
Proof. As for κ t , the Markovian structure allows us to write ξ i t = ξ i (t, D t ) for i ∈ {pre, post} and measurable functions ξ i (t, x). As in the proof of Theorem 3.1 below, we may apply Theorem 6.1 in Janson and Tysk (2006) to obtain the smoothness of ξ i , and hence of κ since κ = ξ post ξ pre − 1 by Proposition 3.1. Differentiating this relation yields
Now, the volatility of a positive F adapted semimartingale of the form u(t, D t ) is given by
, as can be seen from Itô's formula. By Proposition 3.1, θ i is equal to minus the volatility of ξ i , which yields the result.
Observe that θ
is the size of the jump in θ, if default were to occur at time t. Proposition 3.2 shows in particular that if this quantity is positive, the default risk premium moves in the opposite direction to the economic state process: an increase in the economic state process is accompanied by a decrease in the default risk premium, and vice versa. This appears to suggest that, upon default, a risk averse investor who sees an upward jump in the market price of risk, prefers to shift wealth from the risky stock to a default-free bond, giving a sure payoff of at maturity. If, on the other hand, θ post t − θ pre t is negative, the default risk premium moves in the same direction as the economic state process.
We proceed to study how the market price of risk θ t behaves at default. As we have just seen, this also provides information about the sensitivity of the default risk premium κ t to changes in D t . The following result unfortunately requires us to assume constant interest rate and constant default intensity-already in this case the analysis is non-trivial (in particular it is much more delicate than for the jump in the stock price.) Theorem 3.1 Assume that the interest rate and default intensity are constant. If the representative investor has a strictly decreasing absolute risk aversion, then the market price of risk has a nonnegative jump at τ .
The rest of this section is devoted to proving Theorem 3.1. First, let us introduce some notation. For each α > 0, define the function
where the subscripts denote partial derivatives. Using, for instance, Theorem 6.1 in Janson and Tysk (2006), we deduce the required C 1,2 smoothness. Standard results then imply that u α has the same degree of smoothness as σ D and µ D on (0, T ) × (0, ∞), see e.g. Theorem 10 in Chapter 3 of Friedman (2008) . Since we assume that σ D and µ D are infinitely differentiable, the same holds for u α .
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Due to Lemma 3.1 below, the theorem will be proved once we establish that the quantity
decreases in α. This is done in two stages: Lemma 3.2 gives the result when the support of µ D and σ D is compact and bounded away from zero, and Lemma 3.3 extends this to the general case.
Lemma 3.1 Assume that the interest rate and default intensity are constant. If
Proof. It follows from (2.6) and the assumption of constant r and λ that
and
The volatility of a positive F adapted semimartingale of the form u(t, D t ) is given by
, as can be seen from Itô's formula. By Proposition 3.1 and the above expressions for ξ pre t and ξ post t it then follows that
A calculation using that u ε and u 1 are strictly positive reveals that θ post t > θ pre t if and only if
The result now follows.
Lemma 3.2 Assume that the conditions of Theorem 3.1 are satisfied. Assume also that there is a constant
is strictly decreasing in α.
Proof. Define u α = log u α . It can be readily verified that u α satisfies
∂x log u α , and differentiate the above equation with respect to x to see that v α satisfies the nonlinear PDE
with terminal condition
Let us pick β < α, and define w = v β − v α . We want to prove that w > 0. The function w satisfies the terminal value problem
Notice that w(T, x) > 0, as we are assuming that the coefficient of absolute risk aversion U is strictly decreasing. Moreover, the coefficients a, b and c are smooth due to the smoothness of µ D , σ D , v α and v β . The latter functions are smooth since they are the derivatives of the logarithm of the infinitely differentiable functions u α and u β . Now, let X = (X t ) 0≤t≤T be the solution to the SDE
The smoothness of a and b implies that a unique strong solution exists up to an explosion time, but since σ D (x) = 0 and µ D (x) = 0 for all x / ∈ (C −1 , C), we have a(x) = 0 and b(t, x) = 0 there, so no explosion can occur. Indeed, C −1 ≤ X t ≤ C holds for 0 ≤ t ≤ T , almost surely.
Next, define a process Y = (Y t ) 0≤t≤T by
Itô's formula and the fact that w satisfies (3.3) show that
and since X t remains in a compact set and a, c and w x are continuous, the integrand in front of dB t is bounded. Therefore Y is a martingale, and its final value is Y T = e T 0 c(s,Xs)ds w(T, X T ) > 0 due to the boundary condition of w. We deduce that Y t > 0 for every t almost surely, and hence that w > 0, as desired.
Lemma 3.3 Assume that the conditions of Theorem 3.1 are satisfied. Then
is nonincreasing in α.
Proof. Fix β > α. The goal is to show that −u α x /u α ≥ −u β x /u β . For each n ∈ N, let µ n and σ n be infinitely differentiable and coincide with µ D , respectively σ D , on [n −1 , n], while being zero outside the interval [(n + 1) −1 , n + 1]. Denote by D n the solution to
. An application of Lemma 3.2 shows that
for each n. It thus suffices to prove that u α,n → u α and u α,n x → u α x pointwise. The latter follows from the former using interior Schauder estimates, for instance by applying the corollary of Theorem 15 in Chapter 3 of Friedman (2008) on each subdomain [0, T ) × (m −1 , m), m ≥ 2 (using the PDE representation of u α,n , and noticing that on each subdomain the coefficients of the parabolic operator associated to u α,n are Hölder continuous, and x 2 σ n (x) 2 is bounded away from zero for all sufficiently large n.)
To prove that u α,n (t, x) → u α (t, x), first note that u α,n (t,
by the Markov property. Since U (· + α) is bounded, the desired convergence follows from the Bounded Convergence Theorem if D n T −t → D T −t almost surely, with D n 0 = D 0 = x. But this is clear: pathwise uniqueness and the construction of µ n and σ n imply that D and D n coincide on the event 
Equilibrium stock price
In this section we study how the market price of the stock changes when default occurs. If τ < T , there may be a jump in the stock price at τ . Under certain cyclicality assumptions on the default intensity and interest rate, the sign of the jump must be negative. On the other hand, in specific circumstances it can happen that the jump is positive. The following results gives the precise conditions. The proofs rely on a number of lemmas, which are stated and proven in Appendix B.
Theorem 4.1 Assume that the interest rate is constant, and that the representative investor has strictly decreasing absolute risk aversion, as well as relative risk aversion bounded by one. Define
Then the following hold.
(i) If φ(x)g(t, x) is strictly increasing in x for every 0 ≤ t ≤ T , the stock price has a strictly positive jump at τ .
(ii) If φ(x)g(t, x) is strictly decreasing in x for every 0 ≤ t ≤ T , the stock price has a strictly negative jump at τ .
Proof.
Equations (2.6), (2.7) and (2.8) show that the jump in the stock price is given by
Using that ξ 
where Cov t denotes F t -conditional covariance, and φ is defined in (4.1). We also used that r t ≡ r is constant. It suffices to analyze the two covariances, since both ξ pre t and S post t are strictly positive. Let us fix t. By the Markov property of D (and using that λ t = λ(D t )), we may without loss of generality assume that t = 0 (and think of T as T − t), as long as the starting point D 0 > 0 is allowed to be arbitrary. By conditioning on D T , we find Cov e
and Cov e
where g(x) = g(0, x) is given in (4.1). By concavity of U , x → e rT U (x+ε) is decreasing. Moreover, the function ψ(x) = xU (x + ε) has a derivative ψ (x) = U (x + ε) + xU (x + ε), which is strictly greater than zero if and only if
This is indeed the case as the relative risk aversion is bounded by one. Thus ψ is strictly increasing. Under the assumption of (i), g(x)φ(x) is strictly increasing, so the first covariance is strictly positive, while the second is strictly negative. This uses the fact that for positive, strictly increasing functions h 1 and h 2 , and any non-constant random variable X, Cov(h 1 (X), h 2 (X)) > 0, while if h 2 is strictly decreasing, Cov(h 1 (X), h 2 (X)) < 0.
Under the assumption of (ii) that g(x)φ(x) is strictly decreasing, the situation reverses and the jump becomes strictly negative.
The following result shows that the stock price jump will be negative under more general conditions than those of Theorem 4.1.
Theorem 4.2 Assume that the interest rate is counter-cyclical and the default intensity procyclical. If the representative agent has strictly decreasing absolute risk aversion, then the stock price has a strictly negative jump at τ .
Proof. Let a t , b t , c t and d t be as in the proof of Theorem 4.1. From Equation (4.2) we see that a sufficient condition for having a strictly negative jump is that a t d t − b t c t > 0 for all t ≤ T . As in the proof of Theorem 4.1 it suffices to consider t = 0.
By Lemma B.4 and the cyclicality of r and λ, we have
, we obtain by conditioning on D T that
Here φ(x) is again given by (4.1). The derivative of φ is
which is strictly negative since the absolute risk aversion is assumed to be strictly decreasing. Therefore φ is strictly decreasing. Moreover, by Lemma B.4 and the cyclicality of r and λ, the functions f and g are decreasing. They are also strictly positive. Hence
Observing that D T has no atoms and U (x + ε) > 0, Lemma B.5 then yields that
Naively one might expect the jump in the stock price always to be negative, for the following reason. The default event leads to an instantaneous drop in the aggregate wealth in the economy. If the representative investor has a decreasing absolute risk aversion, this should lead to a reduced demand for the risky asset (after default, the stock is the only risky asset). This in turn forces the stock price down so that market clearing is maintained.
Such an argument supposes that the stock price jump is exclusively a wealth effect. However, when the default intensity is stochastic, there is also a "non-myopic" effect originating from expected future co-movements of the default intensity and the economic state process. Specifically, if the default intensity is highly counter-cyclical, and the current (pre-default) value of the economic state process is low, then even a moderate expected future increase of the economic state process is coupled with a dramatic future reduction in the default intensity. The representative investor, in anticipation of the reduced risk of default, may then wish to shift wealth to the defaultable bond. This causes a downward pressure on the stock price, pushing it below what would be its fundamental value, were there no defaultable bond in the economy. When the default occurs, this downward pressure vanishes, and the stock price jumps up.
Of course, the same reasoning could be used for very high values of the economic state process to argue that the jump would be negative in these cases. Consistent with this observation, we have found that the function x → φ(x)g(t, x) appearing in Theorem 4.1 becomes decreasing for large values of x, even in examples where λ is highly counter-cyclical. In such cases the price jump will still be (mostly) positive on simulated paths, if the probability is sufficiently small that D t ever reaches the high levels where the function is decreasing.
We end this section with a numerical case study to support the argument just made. Specifically, we assume that the process in Eq. (2.1) is a geometric Brownian motion, i.e. µ D (x) = µ and σ D (x) = σ. Using time reversal of diffusions, see Lemma B.6 in Appendix B, we may write
where the process D satisfies the SDE .
We set µ = −0.2, σ = 0.3, D 0 = 1, r = 0.03, and use a strongly counter-cyclical default intensity given by λ(x) = 9e −x . Further, we choose a logarithmic utility function given by U (x) = log(x). We estimate via Monte-Carlo simulations that at the default time the stock experiences a positive jump of size 0.001. We also estimate g(x) via Monte-Carlo simulations using (4.4) and (4.5), and report the behavior of φ(x)g(x) in Figure 1 . We see that this function is initially increasing, and it only starts decreasing when x is sufficiently large x (x > 9). However, the probability that the geometric Brownian motion with negative drift reaches those values before time T , given that it starts at 1, is extremely low.
Wealth processes
We now proceed to study how the wealth of the agents in the economy is affected upon default. In Section 5.1 we review the wealth dynamics of the investors, and study its behavior at default in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 considers the special case of power utility.
Portfolios and wealth processes
Let us first provide details regarding the investment opportunities faced by the investors. This material is standard, and is reviewed here solely in order to fix the notation. The k:th investor chooses a dynamic portfolio strategy π k = (π S kt , π P kt ) 0≤t≤T , a G predictable and (S, P )-integrable process. π S kt is the proportion of wealth invested in the stock at time t, and π P kt is the proportion of wealth invested in the defaultable bond. The remaining wealth is invested in the money market account to make the strategy self-financing. The investor's strategy must be admissible, meaning that the corresponding wealth process, given by
stays strictly positive for 0 ≤ t ≤ T . The portfolio strategy is chosen to maximize the expected utility E [U k (W kT )]. Market completeness allows one to use standard duality methods to show that the optimal final wealth in equilibrium is given by
where the number y k is the solution to the budget constraint equation,
Moreover, the wealth at times t < T is given by
Equilibrium Wealth Process
The jump in an individual agent's wealth can be analyzed using the same techniques as for the stock price. Starting from Equations (5.2) and (5.3), and using Lemma A.1 in Appendix A, the wealth of the k:th investor can be decomposed into a pre-and post-default term. The result is
The jump in wealth is then ∆W kτ = W post kτ − W pre kτ on {τ ≤ T }. The following result shows that the condition of Theorem 4.2 is also sufficient to ensure a negative jump in wealth. Unfortunately, the structure of the final value of the wealth process prevents us from obtaining a simple condition to guarantee a positive jump. (The reason is that, in contrast to the stock, W kT cannot be expressed as ξ T times an F T -measurable random variable.)
Theorem 5.1 Assume that the interest rate is counter-cyclical and the default intensity procyclical. If the representative agent has strictly decreasing absolute risk aversion, then every agent's wealth process has a strictly negative jump at τ .
Proof. We consider the k:th investor, so let us fix k. The proof follows along the same lines as that of Theorem 4.2. The jump in wealth is
and ι k (x) = I k (y k U (x)). As in the proof of Theorem 4.2, it suffices to prove that a k
U (x+ε) . Since both I k and U are decreasing, ι k is increasing. Hence
The cyclicality of r and λ implies, via Lemma B.4, that
, we obtain by conditioning on D that
Now, the cyclicality of r and λ together with Lemma B.2 shows that f and g are decreasing. Since also f is strictly positive, φ is strictly decreasing, and ι k is increasing, we have 
Jump sizes under power utility
We investigate how the size of the jump is affected by the risk aversion of the agents. For this, we assume that all agents have power utility with relative risk aversion γ k ∈ (0, 1]. That is,
which should be interpreted as U k (x) = log(x) when γ k = 1. We then have
The following result gives a condition under which a more risk averse investor will suffer a smaller jump in wealth than one who is less risk averse.
Proposition 5.1 Assume that the interest rate is counter-cyclical and the default intensity procyclical, and that the representative agent has strictly decreasing absolute risk aversion. Consider two agents k and with γ k ≥ γ . If
If λ is constant, the statement remains true also in the case where both inequalities are reversed.
Proof. Let a k t , b k t , c t , d t be as in the proof of Theorem 5.1. If W k jumps at t, we have
and this is negative by Theorem 5.1 (this is the only place where the counter-cyclicality of r is needed.) Hence ∆W kτ
Corollary 5.1 Assume that the interest rate is counter-cyclical and the default intensity constant, and that the representative agent has strictly decreasing absolute risk aversion. Consider two agents k and . If γ k = 1, i.e. the k:th investor has log-utility, then
Proof. If λ is constant and γ k = 1, the inequality (5.5) reduces to
This is satisfied since U (x) 1−1/γ is increasing in x, so Proposition 5.1 applies.
Conclusions
We have developed a novel framework where a stock and a defaultable bond interact endogenously through equilibrium mechanisms. Our market consists of a money market account, a stock, and a defaultable bond, which are related to each other only through the underlying economic state process, whose dynamics is unaffected by the default event. The price processes of the stock and of the defaultable bond are determined endogenously in equilibrium. We analyzed in detail the impact of the default event on the stock price, market price of risk, default risk premium, and investor wealth processes, as well as the relations between them. We found that the equilibrium price of the stock typically jumps at default. As the default event has no casual impact on the underlying economic fundamentals, this results in a form of endogenous interaction between the stock and the defaultable bond. We have characterized the direction of the jump of the stock price at default in terms of investor preferences and cyclicality properties of the default intensity, showing that upwards jumps are possible when the default intensity is sufficiently counter-cyclical. Under the assumption of pro-cyclical default intensity and counter-cyclical interest rate, we have shown that the wealth process of the representative investor jumps down upon default, and that power utility investors will suffer a smaller relative jump in wealth if they are more risk averse. In the future, we would like to extend our results to an economy consisting of multiple defaultable securities, and analyze how default correlations and cyclicality properties of the model parameters impact the price of the securities and the aggregate wealth in the economy.
A Results relating to filtration expansion
The following result is due to Kusuoka (1999) .
Theorem A.1 (Martingale representation in G) For every square integrable G martingale N there are G predictable processes (a t ) 0≤t≤T and (b t ) 0≤t≤T , such that
B Results relating to stochastic ordering and correlations
We first state, without proof, a useful lemma which will be used later.
Lemma B.1 (Herbst and Pitt (1991) ) For any one-dimensional diffusion, the function
is monotone increasing (decreasing) in x for all t ∈ [0, T ] if and only if g(x) does so. Furthermore, if both g(x) and h(x) are increasing (or both decreasing), then
If one function is increasing and the other is decreasing, then the inequality reverses.
Lemma B.2 Let X = (X t ) 0≤t≤T satisfy dX t = a(t, X t )dB t + b(t, X t )dt with a fixed starting point X 0 , where we assume that (i) a(t, x) and b(t, x) are infinitely differentiable;
(ii) X does not explode;
(iii) for each t > 0, X t admits a density p(t, x) with continuous second derivatives.
Let Φ be an nondecreasing (nonincreasing) function of x. Then
is nondecreasing (nonincreasing) in x.
Proof. The proof is based on time reversal of diffusions. Let
. We wish to apply Theorem 2.1 in Haussmann and Pardoux (1986) to obtain the dynamics of the time-reversed process Y . The smoothness of p(t, x) and the local Lipschitz property of a and b (guaranteed by their smoothness), together with condition (ii), imply that the assumptions of that theorem are satisfied; see Haussmann and Pardoux (1986) , Remark 2.2 and Section 3. This yields
and B is Brownian motion. The smoothness of p, a and b implies that a and b are continuously differentiable on the interior of the support of X, and hence locally Lipschitz there. By localization we may assume they are globally Lipschitz, so that standard comparison theorems (see for instance Ikeda and Watanabe (1977) ) become available. Specifically, if x 1 ≤ x 2 lie in the support of X T , and Y i denotes the solution to (B.1) started from x i , we have P (Y 1 t ≤ Y 2 t , 0 ≤ t < T ) = 1 and hence f (x 1 ) ≤ f (x 2 ) if Φ is nondecreasing. The case of nonincreasing Φ is deduced in the same manner.
Lemma B.3 Let X be as in Lemma B.2. Suppose F 0 , . . . , F n and G 0 , . . . , G n are all nondecreasing (resp. all nonincreasing), nonnegative functions, and let 0 ≤ t 0 ≤ · · · ≤ t n ≤ T . Then
is nondecreasing (resp. nonincreasing), and we have
Proof. We treat the nondecreasing case, the other one being similar. Consider again the time-reversed process Y t = X T −t , and define time points s i = T − t n−i , i = 1, . . . , n and functions F i = F n−i , G i = G n−i . Then 0 ≤ s 0 ≤ · · · ≤ s n ≤ T , and we have
The nondecreasing property of f can now be deduced as in the proof of Lemma B.2. Concerning the inequality, we are done if we can prove that
for any s ≤ s 0 (take s = 0 to recover the desired inequality.) This is achieved by induction similarly as in the proof of Lemma A.4 in Cvitanić and Malamud (2010) . Suppose the inequality holds for n − 1, n − 2, etc. Then by the Markov property of Y and the induction hypothesis,
These functions are nondecreasing by the first part of the lemma, so an application of the induction hypothesis with n = 0 yields
as desired. The case n = 0 follows immediately from Lemma B.1 above.
Lemma B.4 Let X be as in Lemma B.2. Let Φ and Ψ be nondecreasing (resp. nonincreasing) functions. Then Proof. Approximate e T 0 Φ(Xs)ds and e T 0 Ψ(Xs)ds from below using functions of the form F 0 (X t 0 ) · · · F n (X tn ), then apply Lemma B.3 and monotone convergence.
Lemma B.5 Let f , g, G, h and H be measurable functions and define ψ(x, y) = g(x)G(y) − h(x)H(y).
If f (x) and ψ(x, y) + ψ(y, x) are nonnegative for all x and y, then E f (X)g(X) E f (X)G(X) − E f (X)h(X) E f (X)H(X) ≥ 0 (B.3)
for every random variable X for which the left side is well-defined. If f (x) > 0 and ψ(x, y) + ψ(y, x) > 0 for x = y, and X has no atoms, the inequality is strict.
Proof. Let X be an independent copy of X. The left side of (B.3) then equals E f (X)g(X)f ( X)G( X) − f (X)h(X)f ( X)H( X) = E f (X)f ( X)ψ(X, X) , and since X and X are exchangeable, it is also equal to E f (X)f ( X)ψ( X, X)
Adding the two expressions yields E f (X)f ( X) ψ(X, X) + ψ( X, X) , which is nonnegative due to the assumptions on f and ψ. The statement concerning strict inequality is immediate.
Lemma B.6 Assume that the economic state process is a geometric Brownian motion, i.e. dD t = µD t dt + σD t dW t , with D 0 > 0 fixed. Then along with the local Lipschitz property of µx and σx, and the fact that the geometric Brownian motion is nonexplosive, allow applying Theorem 2.1 in Haussmann and Pardoux (1986) . Using Eq. (B.2), we obtain the expressions in Eq. (B.5).
